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Data Diets and Democracy: The




The current debate asks whether the set of technologies that make up the Chinese
Social Credit System (CSCS) trends toward digital dictatorship or digital republic.
I make two points. First, Chinese AI may well become stronger than Western AI
because of differences in the data available to train machine learning algorithms.
Second, the mechanisms of machine learning may tend toward a reversal of the
longstanding advantages of information decentralization in capitalist economies, with
negative knock-on effects for liberal democracies worldwide.
My conclusions: the CSCS trends against democracy. It is being built by a
competent and motivated anti-democratic system with social control as one stated
goal. The more important question though is whether the Chinese machine learning
data diet will make Chinese AI stronger than Western AI, and whether the realities of
machine learning will undermine Western-style capitalism and liberal democracy. As
this essay argues, I think there is a real chance that both will occur.
These conclusions place the current piece in both agreement with and at odds
with the framing arguments for this debate. Both Reijers and van ‘t Klooster move
from talking about the CSCS to a discussion of a SCS. That move is correct in
that the surface question of whether the Chinese version of these systems will
be turned to anti-democratic ends is not particularly interesting. But machine
learning algorithms cannot be divorced from the data they study – data produced
by citizens in a given context. Thus, I place the machine learning algorithms back
into context by talking about the role that citizen-produced data plays in training
machine learning algorithms. For three reasons, discussed below, Chinese machine
learning algorithms may benefit from more and more varied data than do Western
versions, and this in turn may impact the underpinnings of capitalism and democracy
worldwide.
The Chinese Data Diet
The key to machine learning is data, its volume, completeness, and variety. Recent
advances in algorithm design have been merely (or mostly) advances in the
amount, variety, and quality of the data we have been able to feed machine learning
algorithms. Thus, to the extent that the CSCS represents something different from
the emerging Western system of artificial-intelligence-driven pricing (of credit as
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of any other commodity or service), the differences will need to lie in the data
channelled into these systems, and the differences that the artificial intelligences will
learn on a different data diet.
I then leave the reader with some musing about what it would mean if the CSCS
and similar systems generate superior machine learning results because of
improved access to datasets, amount of data, and the new on-ramps created
by the physical systems of the CSCS (neighbour reporting and the like). In
particular, I suggest a dangerous potential overturning of a longstanding principle
of capitalist development. Capitalism in its late-20th century idiom has succeeded
largely because decentralised information processing is far more efficient than is
centralised data processing. The ‘Invisible Hand’ of the market is a metaphor for
the coordinating actions of decentralised economic decision makers, who organise
production around price points, for example. The question is whether the strong
synergies of centralisation inherent in machine learning will undermine this economic
consensus, and thus undermine liberal democracies in general.
Machine learning and related technologies consist of a range of techniques, the
full scope of which is outside the reach of this article. One shift, however, is worth
mentioning. Many of the algorithms we rely upon have existed with minor updates for
a number of decades. What changed in the early 21st century is that the raw volume
of data available to train machine learning algorithms exploded.
Data matters because, for at least many of the most common and most effective
machine learning programs, the machine does not understand anything. Rather, it
finds connections in data by looking at a lot of it. Machine learning algorithms rely on
correlations in the data that are relevant to the prediction the algorithm is trying to
make. The more data a machine learning algorithm can ingest, the more correlations
it can find. If one’s concern is pure accuracy and not explainability, the weights used
by a machine learning program can be quite extensive: perhaps my political reliability
or creditworthiness correlates with my social media contacts, recent purchases,
books read, social media commentary, outcomes of judicial processes, and so
on. Each correlation may yield information gain, which will help in making a better
selection.
The difference in the machine learning algorithms created for advertisement, election
influence, and creditworthiness in the West and those that result from the CSCS –
if there are important and salient differences – can be usefully explained in terms
of the differences in data diet that the CSCS system affords. This point has gone
underexplored in the debate. The following parts discuss how the CSCS might differ
from the Western machine learning context in terms of access to data, amount of
data, and physical on-ramping.
Access to Data
Data in the United States and Europe is often kept separate from other data pools.
This is often for reasons more of competition than privacy. Facebook’s knowledge
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of its users is its goldmine; likewise, Google’s tracking of users as they interact with
websites across the internet. A machine learning algorithm that had access to the
combined Facebook and Google datasets would be able to extract out features and
would undoubtedly be more accurate than one based on either browser-tracking or
social media interactions alone. Unintentionally, this offers some protection against
machine learning algorithms. The question is whether the Chinese political structure
offers avenues for combining datasets that western countries do not.
First, the Chinese government has a stronger hand in the information industry than
do Western governments. This government whip-hand sometimes merely increases
raw government power, for example, in the form of country-wide censorship
mandated by the government and carried out by industry. Second, the Chinese
government’s overt encouragement of the CSCS overlaps with its public commitment
and large investment in artificial intelligence. In addition, powerful consortia vie for
the political and commercial capital at play. My view is that there is ample cause
to believe that these political considerations may cause Chinese AI to benefit from
larger and more varied datasets than do those trained by individual U.S. companies,
no matter how large.
Amount of Data
A key question is whether the Chinese legal, cultural, and technological frameworks
permit access to more, different, and more granular data. More data is easy to
imagine, but hard to confirm. The population numbers are higher: some estimates
put the number of mobile internet users in China at more than double the entire
United States population. That is a lot of smartphones recording a lot of data, which
can be used for targeted behavioural advertising, political verification, and so forth.
However, overlapping data is often less useful than different datasets. Data about
you as you surf the web is even more useful when combined with data from your
smartphone geolocator, or your smart television’s parsing of your conversations
and viewing habits. This is called sensor fusion: combining multiple datasets often
results in information beyond their sum. Sensor fusion has a greater impact in deeply
gadgeted societies. I am aware of no study on comparative Western-Chinese sensor
fusion. Such a study would prove deeply informative on the relative strengths and
weaknesses of Chinese machine learning.
Municipal On-Ramping
The last element is whether the Chinese government support, especially in the form
of model city initiatives and the structure of bureaucratic advancement within the
Chinese Communist Party, has a strong impact on building out physical sensors, like
smart cities or municipal sensors, that serve to on-ramp citizens’ data and make it
available for machine learning.
I am not certain that government power and different legal and social norms
surrounding privacy make much of a difference for physical on-ramping, at least
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when one compares China to the United States and the U.K. In those countries, the
temptation to circumvent constitutional restrictions on government mass surveillance
by routing the data collection through third-party firms has proven irresistible. In
continental Europe, norms surrounding personal privacy in public spaces take on a
different aspect, and we might expect AI trained on sparser European data to be at
some disadvantage.
Physical on-ramping, in the form of municipal cameras, pressure sensors, and
other so-called “smart city” technology, seems to be developing similar amounts of
coverage in China and the United States. The mechanisms may be slightly more
commercially driven in the U.S., and the government plays more of a recipient
and beneficiary of commercial datasets, which it turns to policing and intelligence
purposes, but I have no sense that the amount and flow of data across physical
sensor networks is less.
My understanding is that often party advancement is tied to furtherance of party buzz
words and goals. To the extent Social Credit is a party buzz word, we may expect
municipal and regional officials to make efforts to develop facilities for the CSCS in
their areas of expertise and authority. If, then, party members who are in positions
of municipal authority believe that physical on-ramping of municipal sensor data is
valuable to their political careers – as I think evidence indicates is the case at least
at present – then we might expect data on-ramping through municipal sensors to
strongly exceed at least European rates.
Concluding Thoughts
I have raised these points because they are salient to the two fundamental questions
posed by the CSCS. Those questions are political and economic, if one sees those
as separate spheres. The political element, which has attracted the most attention,
is the extent to which the CSCS will be profoundly anti-democratic. Since the CSCS
was designed by and for a non-democratic political system, this is a bit of a non-
question. Of course, the system is being used to enforce political hygiene, and there
is already more than enough evidence of these technologies being used to monitor
and oppress.
The follow-on problem is harder. AI in general, and machine learning as its
most currently successful instantiation, may destabilise the current consensus
in economics that decentralised information processes in markets, coordinated
primarily by price points, are the best way to run an economic system. It is not
inconceivable that machine learning may change the playing field of capitalism. I do
not suggest that centralised AI will be able to guide a national economy better than
will some form of combined machine learning and decentralised firm-based decision-
making, but I do suggest that the balance of those contributing elements may shift
decidedly.
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